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10 August 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

USSR: Khrushchev continues to tell Western officials that he is about to undertake massive new investments in support of his agricultural and consumer goods programs.

In a conversation with Agriculture Secretary Freeman on 30 July, Khrushchev linked his proposed new course directly to a reduction in military spending: "We are fed up with rockets, we have enough rockets. We are going to divert this money to agriculture." Khrushchev said chemical fertilizer production would be increased from the present 20 million tons to 100 million tons annually by 1970.. He also said the USSR wanted to import plants for producing fertilizer, herbicides, and mixed feeds.

There is good evidence that agriculture and the chemical industry are already receiving increased support and that even more will be forthcoming. However, none of it as yet justifies the conclusion that a program of the magnitude suggested by Khrushchev will, in fact, be seriously pursued.

In his references to having sufficient rockets, Khrushchev may be referring to future levels which will be reached from programs already under way. Several programs--such as the SA-2 and the MRBM--are probably approaching completion. There is no indication as yet that the USSR has decided to phase down the production and deployment of other missile systems. However, any decisions taken recently which affect Soviet missile programs would not be apparent for some time.

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Dominican Republic: (President Bosch's increasing domestic opposition may soon require him to make drastic changes in his government or be forced out of office.)

(US Ambassador Martin comments that the situation has "not yet reached the flashpoint"--the military high command is still loyal to Bosch--but that a crisis may materialize by early or mid-September.)

(Bosch's difficulties are attributable largely to his "singular lack of capacity to govern," according to the US ambassador. He has surrounded himself with second-rate cabinet officials and advisers who are largely incompetent or dishonest. He has lost much of his initial popular support--including that of important segments of his own political party--through failing to implement rapidly his program of urgently needed social and economic reforms.)

(Bosch has alienated the conservative political elements of the country by his refusal to take an open stand against Communists and by other policies which they consider hostile to their interests. According to the US ambassador, the pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group is thus becoming a key element in Bosch's political support.)

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Brazil: (The Brazilian Senate's approval on 7 August of the nomination to the Supreme Court of extreme leftist Foreign Minister Evandro Lins e Silva is a further step toward giving President Goulart a sympathetic court majority.)

(Lins' prejudice in favor of the extreme left is likely to affect his court decisions. Lins is probably going to pursue a course similar to that of former Foreign Minister Hermes Lima, who has demonstrated a lack of impartiality since his appointment to the court earlier this year. In addition to Lins and Hermes Lima, two other members of the 11-man court have relatively recent extreme leftist connections.)

(Lins' replacement at the Foreign Ministry has not been announced, but the individuals who have been mentioned in public speculation range over a broad spectrum.)

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Burma: (General Ne Win has cracked down on moderate opposition elements who have been increasingly bold in their criticism of the military régime.)

(Among those arrested in Rangoon yesterday were Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein, leaders of the once dominant Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, as well as several officers of former Premier U Nu's Union Party. A government communiqué has charged those arrested with trying to wreck amnesty negotiations currently under way with various Communist and ethnic insurgent groups.)

(Ba Swe earlier claimed that his arrest, which has long been threatened, would trigger a counter-revolutionary movement. The decisive power factor continues to be the military, which thus far has supported Ne Win despite some discontent over his extreme socialist policies.)

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NOTES

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South Vietnam: The growing effectiveness of the government's Civilian Irregular Defense Group--a US-trained local militia force--has resulted in a sharp step-up of Viet Cong action against the group. During July, the Communists made a determined bid to disrupt militia recruitment and training through armed attacks and propaganda. There is some evidence that the Communists hope to put more pressure on the militia by reinforcing Viet Cong units operating near isolated militia camps.

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Sudan: (The refugee leaders of the southern Sudanese separatist movement are increasingly in favor of attempting to develop guerrilla warfare in the southern Sudan and may soon attempt to launch some insurrectionary or terroristic activities. The government is aware of these threats, and for some time has maintained tight security controls in the south. Nevertheless, some minor disturbances may occur.)

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